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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' November 3, 
2014 substitute opinion in this case. State v. Larson, Docket No. 40091, 2014 
Opinion No. 64S (Idaho App., Nov. 3, 2014) (hereinafter "Substitute Opinion" 
(attached hereto as Appendix A)). Review is appropriate because the Idaho 
Court of Appeals decided a question of substance not heretofore decided by this 
Court, in a manner inconsistent with prior precedent, that a prosecutor misstates 
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the law during closing argument by stating, inter a/ia, that intentionally pointing a 
weapon at someone in an assaultive manner constitutes aggravated assault. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings In District Court And On Appeal 
Lora Adams had a brief romantic relationship with Larson. (Tr. 1, p.185, 
L.12 - p.188, L.20.) Larson did not respond well when Adams told him she just 
wanted to be friends - he developed a pattern of being angry, then apologetic, 
and he started to become threatening, acting like he was going to hit Adams. 
(Tr., p.188, L.19- p.191, L.6.) 
Adams and Larson were also neighbors in a somewhat rural area in 
Bonner County and Adams had to drive past Larson's property in order to get to 
her house. (Tr., p.181, L.9 - p.185, L.1.) Larson would stop Adams a couple of 
times per week as she was traveling to or from her house. (Tr., p.200, Ls.4-13.) 
At one point, Larson told Adams he was going to erect gates at the property line 
and make her life a "living hell." (Tr., p.198, Ls.6-11.) As promised, Larson 
erected gates across the road that Adams had to open in order to get home. 
(Tr., p.198, L.22 - p.199, L.10, p.201, Ls.4-6; see p.213, Ls.5-22.) 
Larson's confrontational behavior escalated after John Bilsky came to stay 
with Adams for several weeks. (Tr., p.196, L.20 - p.197, L.18) Larson started 
shooting his gun off in his yard and would call Adams, hang up, and go outside 
and fire more rounds. (Tr., p.201, L.11 - p.203, L.5.) Adams ultimately decided 
to sell her home because of Larson's behavior. (Tr., p.199, L.14 - p.200, L.8.) 
1 There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal. All transcript 
references in this brief will be to the trial transcript. 
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One afternoon, after Adams sold her home and was preparing to move, 
she encountered Larson waiting for her on her way home. (Tr., p.207, L.22 -
p.212, L.17.) Before being confronted by Larson that day, Adams called Bilsky 
to let him know she was on her way - a practice Adams and Bilsky had 
established given the situation with Larson because there was a point at which 
Adams no longer had cell service and the only way to communicate was by 
walkie talkie. (Tr., p.209, L.24 - p.210, L.18.) When Adams called Bilsky that 
day, Bilsky warned her Larson had been shooting his gun again. (Tr., p.210, 
L.24 - p.211, L.3.) As Adams approached the gate, which was closed, she saw 
Larson laying on his A TV and reported such to Bilsky. (Tr., p.212, Ls.13-23.) 
When Adams got out of her car to unlatch the gate, Larson said, "You 
effin' skinny little bitch are you gonna to [sic] throw the cable in the snow like you 
always do?" (Tr., p.213, Ls.11-14.) Adams ignored Larson as she unlatched the 
gate to drive through while Larson followed her and yelled obscenities at her and 
called her names. (Tr., p.213, L.15 - p.214, L.13.) Adams testified Larson was 
"enraged." (Tr., p.214, Ls.18-20.) 
Larson would not let Adams get back in her car, so Adams "tried to knee" 
Larson "in the stomach or in the groin" in an effort to get away. (Tr., p.215, L.6 -
p.216, L.10.) After that, Larson and Adams exchanged words and Larson 
started punching Adams in the side of the head. (Tr., p.216, Ls.11-20.) Larson 
stopped hitting Adams when Adams yelled for Bilsky but "somehow" Adams was 
"flung" from where she was standing by her car door and she fell down into a 
snow berm behind her bumper. (Tr., p.217, Ls.5-16.) As Adams tried to get up, 
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Larson "shoved" her and straddled her on the ground and pulled out his gun. 
(Tr., p.217, Ls.18-19, p.231, L.12 - p.232, L.21.) Larson stuck the gun in 
Adams' face and said, 'Tm going to kill you and I want you to be more afraid than 
you've ever been in your life." (Tr., p.233, L.9 - p.234, L 14.) Larson spit in 
Adams' face and grabbed Adams' throat and squeezed it until Adams could not 
breathe. (Tr., p.234, L.19 - p.235, L 16.) 
Bilsky, concerned that Adams was taking longer to get home than she 
should based on the timing of her call, left the house on foot and went to find 
her. (Tr., p.324, L.8 - p.326, L.2.) Bilsky whistled to let Adams know he was 
there and to "hopefully ... get a shout or something like that." (Tr., p.327, L.21 -
p.328, L. 1.) When Larson heard the whistle, he straightened and Adams pushed 
the gun away from her face and kicked Larson off of her. (Tr., p.238, L.2 -
p.240, L.19.) By that time, Bilsky was there and Larson pointed the gun at him, 
told him to leave, and said, "I'll kill you." (Tr., p.242, Ls.1-22, p.337, Ls.16-22.) 
Bilsky said he was leaving and started to retreat but asked Adams if she was 
okay. (Tr., p.242, L.21 - p.243, L.22, p.337, L.24 - p.339, L.6.) Adams 
answered, "no," and Larson started shooting in Bilsky's direction. (Tr., p.243, 
Ls.22-23.) 
Bilsky, who was also armed, returned fire. (Tr., p.340, L.19 - p.341, L.4.) 
Although Adams and Bilsky did not see any blood or see Larson respond as 
though he had been shot, Larson said he was shot in the chest and started to 
walk away. 2 (Tr., p.246, Ls.1-8, p.342, Ls.6-25.) Larson then kneeled and 
2 Larson was treated for a gunshot wound. (Tr., p.638, Ls.1-21.) 
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Adams thought he was "reloading," at which point she and Bilsky got in the car 
and escaped to Adams' house and called 911. (Tr., p.245, L.21 - p.249, L.12, 
p.343, L.2 - p.344, L.8.) 
The state charged Larson with two counts of aggravated assault. (R., 
pp.15-16, 49-50.) In Count I, the state alleged Larson committed an assault by 
"intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent ability threaten[ed] by word and/or act 
to do violence upon the person of Lora Adams, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a 
Ruger 44 caliber revolver, which created a well-founded fear in Lora Adams that 
such violence was imminent." (R., pp.49-50.) In Count II, the state alleged 
Larson committed an assault against Bilsky in the same manner it alleged 
Larson assaulted Adams; it also alleged an alternative means of assault - that 
Larson assaulted Bilsky by "unlawfully and with apparent ability, attempt[ed] to 
commit a violent injury upon ... Bilsky, with a deadly weapon." (R., p.50.) As 
reflected in the charging language, the state's theory of assault against Adams 
and Bilsky was based on I.C. § 18-901 (a), and, with respect to Bilsky, the state 
presented an alternative or additional theory that Larson assaulted Bilsky in the 
manner proscribed by I.C. § 18-901(b). The jury convicted Larson of both 
counts. (R., p.126.) The court imposed a unified five-year sentence with two 
years fixed. (R., pp.171-173.) Larson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., 
pp.175-177.) 
On appeal, Larson raised two claims: 
1. Did the district court err in allowing the opinion testimony of 
Detective Johnston as an expert witness as to the science of 
ballistics? 
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2. Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)3 
Larson's prosecutorial misconduct claim was premised on his assertion 
that the prosecutor "misstate[d] the law in closing arguments." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.11.) The alleged misstatement related to Jury Instruction No. 13, which reads: 
"In every crime or public offense, there must exist a union or joint operation of 
act and intent." (Instruction No. 13 (exhibit).) This instruction is based on I.C. § 
18-114, which includes the exact same language except the statute also adds 
the clause, "or criminal negligence." In addressing Instruction No. 13, the 
prosecutor commented that the instruction "is not a model of clarity" and 
"submit[ted] that the word 'intent' in this context does not mean the intent to 
commit a crime." (Tr., p. 795, Ls.18-23.) The prosecutor continued: 
What that jury instruction speaks to is you don't have to have the 
intent to commit the crime itself; you have the intent to commit the 
interdicted act. That is, you don't have to have the intent to commit 
the crime of aggravated assault; you have to have the intent to 
point and point the weapon, use -- ... so in an assaultive manner. 
(Tr., p.796, L.16 - p.797, L.1 (emphasis added, objection omitted).) The 
prosecutor completed his explanation by stating: "So not unlike a DUI, to put it in 
context, you don't have to have the intent to drive while under the influence of 
alcohol; you simply have to have the intent to drive the automobile. That's what 
that instruction means." (Tr., p.797, Ls.7-12 (emphasis added).) 
3 The state does not intend to address Larson's first issue in this brief. To the 
extent this Court grants review in this case, the state will rely on its Respondent's 
Brief for its argument with respect to this claim. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-11.) 
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On appeal, Larson argued that the prosecutor's argument "lowered the 
State's burden of proof and left the jury with the impression that it could convict 
[him] even if it found that he did not intend to make a threat or commit a battery." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) The state disagreed, asserting that the point of the 
prosecutor's comments in relation to Instruction No. 13 was to explain to the jury 
that that particular instruction did not require a separate intent; rather, the only 
intent the state was required to prove was the intent to commit the "interdicted 
act." (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) This is an accurate explanation of that 
particular instruction. State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 
(1993) (quotations and citations omitted); State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 
580, 759 P.2d 83, 86 (Ct. App. 1988)4. Thus, the prosecutor's argument was 
consistent with judicial interpretation of the statute upon which the instruction 
was based. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the state's position, noting that Bonaparte 
and State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 88 P.2d 493 (1939), upon which the Court 
in Bonaparte relied, "are inconsistent with more recent Idaho appellate authority." 
State v. Larson, 2014 Opinion No. 64, p.8 (Idaho App. August 15, 2014) 
4 In State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 580, 759 P.2d 83, 86 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(citations omitted), the Court of Appeals stated: 
[T]he criminal intent which is required for assault with a deadly 
weapon . . . is the general intent to willfully commit an act the 
direct, natural and probable consequences of which if successfully 
completed would be the injury to another. Given that intent it is 
immaterial whether or not the defendant intended to violate the law 
or knew that his conduct was unlawful. The intent to cause any 
particular injury, to severely injure another, or to injure in the sense 
of inflicting bodily harm is not necessary. 
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("Opinion") (citing State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 436, 13 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Ct. 
App. 2000).) The Court of Appeals specifically cited its opinion in Crowe in 
which it expressed its "doubts" as to the "continuing viability of the Patterson rule 
in light of more recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions indicating that guilt of 
'attempt' crimes requires intent to commit the 'attempted' offense." (Opinion, 
p.8.) The Court of Appeals "conclude[d] that [this Court's opinion] in Patterson 
and [its own opinion in] Bonaparte have been implicitly overruled and that by the 
plain language of I.C. § 18-901 (a), assault by attempt to commit a violent injury 
requires an actual intent to injure." (Opinion, p.9.) 
With respect to the "second means of committing assault" under I.C. § 18-
901 (b), the Court of Appeals noted that the state is only required to "prove an 
intent to make a threat" and that instructing a jury that a defendant only had to 
have the intent to fire a weapon, but not the intent to threaten the victim, would 
be an erroneous instruction. (Opinion, pp.9-10 (citations omitted).) 
Applying the foregoing principles to Larson's claim of misconduct, the 
Court of Appeals concluded the prosecutor's "statement was not consistent" with 
those principles. (Opinion, p.10.) The Court reasoned: 
The "intent to point a weapon ... in an assaultive manner" is not 
the equivalent of the intent to cause a violent injury; one can point a 
firearm at a person in an intimidating way but not intend to shoot. 
Likewise, an "intent to commit the interdicted act" is not equivalent 
to the intent to threaten. The meaning of the "intent to commit the 
interdicted act" is ambiguous and could have been understood by 
the jury to require only an intent to point the weapon. It is 
equivalent to the intent to "perform the act committed," language .. 
. we held to be erroneous [in State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 224 
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P.3d 509 (Ct. App. 2009)], when a person is charged with assault 
under I.C. § 18-901(b). 
(Opinion, p.10 (footnote omitted).) 
Based on this reasoning, and applying the standards for reviewing 
instructional error, the Court of Appeals held "the prosecutor misstated the law" 
and the district court "erred by overruling Larson's objection," but found the error 
harmless. (Opinion, pp.10-13.) 
The state requested rehearing in relation to the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that the prosecutor's explanation of I.C. § 18-114, using language 
from Idaho case law, constituted "misconduct." (Respondent's Brief in Support 
of Rehearing.) More specifically, the state submitted that whether cases 
subsequent to Bonaparte changed the law regarding intent for attempt crimes is 
not relevant to whether the prosecutor's explanation of Instruction No. 13 was a 
correct statement of the law because the prosecutor's explanation of the 
meaning of Instruction No. 13 was not itself a misstatement. This was true even 
if the Court of Appeals believed that the union of act and intent instruction was 
unnecessary or even improper in this case. Moreover, even if Instruction No. 13 
should not have been given, that was not the question presented on appeal nor 
was it the objection made by Larson below. Once an instruction is given, a 
prosecutor is entitled to discuss it in closing argument. State v. Erickson, 148 
Idaho 679, 685, 227 P.3d 933, 939 (Ct. App. 2010) (closing argument properly 
includes the opportunity "to discuss the law set forth in the jury instructions as it 
applies to the trial evidence"). 
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The state also noted on rehearing that, besides being consistent with I.C. 
§ 18-114, the prosecutor's argument was also consistent with aggravated assault 
by threat because, even assuming the meaning of I. C. § 18-114 is inconsistent 
with the attempted battery theory under I.C. § 18-901(a), liability under 
subsection (b) does not involve an attempt crime, but only requires an 
"intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of 
another, coupled with the apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which 
creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent." 
(Respondent's Brief in Support of Rehearing, pp.6-7.) 
The Court of Appeals denied the state's petition for rehearing but issued a 
substitute opinion. 5 In its original Opinion, the Court of Appeals wrote: "Larson 
also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when attempting to 
explain the meaning of a jury instruction that was based on I.C. § 18-114." 
(Opinion, p.6.) In its substitute opinion, the Court of Appeals recharacterized 
Larson's argument as claiming "that the district court erred by overruling his 
objection to the prosecutor's statements during closing argument regarding a jury 
instruction that was based on I.C. § 18-114." (Substitute Opinion, p.6.) The 
Court of Appeals also eliminated the legal standards regarding misconduct 
5 In its Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, the Court of Appeals stated. it 
"appreciated the filing of the petition and on this date has directed the issuance 
of a substitute opinion" but "[b]ecause the ultimate outcome on appeal remains 
unaffected," the petition for rehearing was denied. (Order Denying Petition for 
Rehearing, dated November 3, 2014.) 
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claims that it included in its original opinion.6 (Compare Opinion, pp.6-7, 10 with 
Substitute Opinion, pp.6-7, 10.) The Court, however, kept the following 
language: "Larson argues that the prosecutor's purported explanation of the 
mental element misstated the law and impermissibly reduced the State's burden 
of proof' (Compare Opinion, p.6 with Substitute Opinion, p.7), but changed its 
conclusion from "Because the prosecutor misstated the law, the district court 
erred by overruling Larson's objection" (Opinion, p.10) to "Because the 
prosecutor's description of the required mental elements was inaccurate, the 
district court erred by overruling Larson's objection" (Substitute Opinion, p.10). 
With respect to the state's assertion on rehearing that the Court of 
Appeals erred in its analysis of the prosecutor's comments regarding Instruction 
No. 13 in relation to I.C. § 18-901 (b), the Court of Appeals made the following 
revision, which appears in bold: 
Here, the prosecutor's statement was not consistent with the 
foregoing authorities. The "intent to point a weapon . . . in an 
assaultive manner" is not the equivalent of the intent to cause a 
violent injury; one can point a firearm at a person in an intimidating 
way but not intend to shoot. Likewise, an "intent to commit the 
interdicted act" is not equivalent to the intent to threaten. The 
meaning of the "intent to commit the interdicted act" is not 
equivalent to the intent to threaten, the mens rea element 
required by I.C. § 18-901(b). The meaning of the "intent to 
commit the interdicted act" is ambiguous and could have been 
understood by the jury to require only an intent to point the 
weapon. It is equivalent to the intent to "perform the act 
committed," language ... we held to be erroneous [in State v. 
Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 224 P.3d 509 (Ct. App. 2009)], when a 
person is charged with assault under I.C. § 18-901 (b). 
6 While the state certainly appreciates elimination of the word "misconduct" in 
referring to the prosecutor's closing argument given that the prosecutor did not 
commit misconduct, Larson's claim on appeal was that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct (Appellant's Brief, pp.7, 11-16). 
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(Substitute Opinion, pp.9-10 (bold added); compare Opinion, p.10.) 
The state filed a timely petition for review. 
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ISSUE ON REVIEW 
Is review appropriate because the Idaho Court of Appeals decided a 
question of substance not heretofore decided by this Court, in a manner 
inconsistent with prior precedent, that a prosecutor misstates the law during 
closing argument by stating, inter alia, that intentionally pointing a weapon at 
someone in an assaultive manner constitutes aggravated assault? 
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ARGUMENT 
Review Is Appropriate Because The Idaho Court of Appeals Incorrectly Decided 
A Question Of Substance Not Heretofore Decided By This Court, In A Manner 
Inconsistent With Prior Precedent, That A Prosecutor Misstates The Law During 
Closing Argument By Stating, Inter Alia, That Intentionally Pointing A Weapon At 
Someone In An Assaultive Manner Constitutes Aggravated Assault 
A. Introduction 
In explaining the union of act and intent jury instruction, the prosecutor 
correctly explained that that particular instruction did not require proof that 
Larson intended to commit a crime, but only required proof that Larson had the 
intent to commit the "interdicted act," i.e., the "intent to point the weapon ... in 
an assaultive manner." (Tr., p.796, L.16 - p.797, L.1 (objection omitted).) The 
Court of Appeals found this argument constituted a misstatement of the law 
"[b]ecause the prosecutor's description of the required mental elements was 
inaccurate." (Substitute Opinion, p.10.) In reaching this conclusion and in 
finding the error harmless, the Court of Appeals applied legal standards related 
to instructional error claims as opposed to standards related to misconduct 
claims. (Substitute Opinion, pp.9-12.) Because the Court of Appeals' conclusion 
that the prosecutor misstated the law was erroneous and because its application 
of instructional error standards was improper, review is appropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of 
Appeals decision, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court 
of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower court. State v. Boren, 
156 Idaho 498, 499, 328 P.3d 478, 479 (2014) (quotations and citation omitted). 
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"Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which the Court exercises free 
review." ~ 
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court 
exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex rel. 
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630 
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted). A defendant who claims the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct has the burden of proving such. State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59, 253 P.3d 727, 733 (2011) (citing State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010)). If the alleged misconduct is 
followed by a contemporaneous objection, and if the reviewing court finds error, 
the error is reviewed under the harmless error standard. ~ (citing Perry at 227, 
245 P.3d at 979). 
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate The Law During Closing Argument 
Idaho Code§ 18-114 provides that "In every crime or public offense there 
must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." 
Instruction No. 13, given in this case, reads: "In every crime or public offense, 
there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent." Thus, Instruction 
No. 13 was identical to I. C. § 18-114 with the exception that the instruction 
eliminated the "or criminal negligence" language from the statute. 
In discussing I.C. § 18-114, this Court has stated: "[T]he intent required 
by I.C. § 18-114 is not the intent to commit a crime, but is merely the intent to 
knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the failure to 
perform the required act." Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183. Thus, when 
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the prosecutor in this case said the word "intent" as used in Instruction No. 13 did 
not "mean the intent to commit a crime," but meant the "intent to commit the 
interdicted act," he did not misstate the law because the prosecutor's statement 
was nearly identical to this Court's statement in Fox about "the intent required by 
I.C. § 18-114." Notwithstanding this, the Court of Appeals focused on the 
prosecutor's subsequent comment, that "you don't have to have the intent to 
commit the crime of aggravated assault; you have to have the intent to point and 
point the weapon ... in an assaultive manner." (Tr., p.796, L.19 - p.797, L.1.) 
The Court of Appeals concluded this was a misstatement of the law with respect 
to both theories the state alleged in support of its aggravated assault charges 
against Larson. (Substitute Opinion, pp.9-10.) This is incorrect. 
Idaho Code Section 18-901 provides two alternative means for committing 
assault. The first requires "[a]n unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, 
to commit a violent injury on the person of another." l.C. § 18-901 (a). The 
second requires "[a]n intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to 
the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some 
act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is 
imminent." I.C. § 18-901 (b). The state alleged the second means in relation to 
both Adams and Bilsky and alleged the first as an alternative means only with 
respect to Bilsky; the jury was instructed accordingly. 
(Information); Jury Instruction Nos. 16, 17 (exhibits).) 
(R., pp.49-50 
With respect to the theory of guilt as alleged in relation to both victims -
l.C. § 18-901 (b) - the Court of Appeals concluded the prosecutor's comments 
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misstated the law because "an 'intent to commit the interdicted act' is not 
equivalent to the intent to threaten, the mens rea element required by I.C. § 18-
901 (b)." (Substitute Opinion, pp.9-10.) The prosecutor did not misstate the law 
when he repeated what this Court said in Fox in relation to the meaning of intent 
for purposes of I.C. § 18-114 and Instruction No. 13. 
The only remaining concern would be whether the prosecutor misstated 
the law by saying that the intent to do the interdicted act was the intent to point 
the weapon in an assaultive manner. The Court of Appeals relegated this 
portion of the prosecutor's argument to a footnote, stating: "Whether the intent 
to 'point the weapon ... in an assaultive manner' is the equivalent of an intent to 
threaten may be a closer question. However, we note that this description is 
hopelessly circular because it describes an element of the crime of assault by 
using the term 'assaultive."' (Substitute Opinion, p.10 n.3.) That the Court of 
Appeals finds the explanation "circular" does not, however, mean the explanation 
was a misstatement of the law. Even if the prosecutor's explanation was 
circular, a circular explanation is not the equivalent of a misstatement. The 
correct standards that apply to a claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
during closing argument by misstating the law require the reviewing court to 
consider whether the prosecutor's comments were improper; if the comments 
were not improper, there is no misconduct. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
716, 215 P.3d 414, 436 (2009). In reviewing the challenged statements, the 
Court does not attribute the most damaging meaning to the prosecutor's 
comments. ~ at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (citations omitted). Thus, even assuming 
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this Court agrees that the prosecutor's explanation of Instruction No. 13 was 
"circular," "ambiguous" (Substitute Opinion, p.10), or even confusing, such a 
conclusion does not mean the statement was improper or a misstatement of the 
law. See Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (declining to find 
misconduct based upon most damaging interpretation of prosecutor's ambiguous 
statement). 
Moreover, it was not the prosecutor's duty to instruct the jury on the law; 
that obligation belongs to the court and Larson has not contended that any of the 
court's instructions were erroneous. As such, it was improper for the Court of 
Appeals to apply instructional error standards to the prosecutor's closing 
argument, which the Court of Appeals did in resolving this case. For example, in 
finding error in the prosecutor's description of Instruction No. 13, the Court relied 
on its opinion in State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 445, 224 P.3d 509, 513 (Ct. 
App. 2009), in which it held the trial court committed instructional error by giving 
the I.C. § 18-114 instruction and the elements instruction for assault under I.C. § 
18-901 (b). (Substitute Opinion, p.9.) The Court of Appeals' harmless error 
analysis also centered on harmless error standards applicable to instructional 
error. (Substitute Opinion, p.10 ("Here, the harm produced by the error is akin to 
harm produced by instructional error--the possibility that the jury reached its 
verdict based upon an erroneous legal standard.").) As noted, however, Larson 
did not raise an instructional error claim, he raised a misconduct claim, and, for 
the reasons previously stated, application of the correct legal standards to the 
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claim raised shows that the prosecutor did not misstate the law or engage in 
misconduct. 
Because the prosecutor correctly recited precedent from this Court in 
explaining Instruction No. 13 and because the prosecutor's comments were not 
improper or misconduct, Larson failed to prove his claim of error.7 The Court of 
Appeals erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court grant review and, on review, 
find that the prosecutor did not misstate the law or commit misconduct, and 
affirm the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts finding Larson guilty of two 
counts of aggravated assault. 
DATED this 5th day of January 2015. 
JE~S/CA M. LORELLO 
Dep~y Attorney General 
7 Even if the prosecutor's statements were erroneous, any error was harmless for 
the reasons set forth in the Respondent's Brief. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) 
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lJ 3 2014 
Richard Allen Latson vvas charged with two counts of aggravated assault for threatening 
his ex-girlfriend with a firearm and threatening or attempting to shoot her new boyfriend. The 
case proceeded to trial and the jury found Larson guilty on both counts. On appeal, Larson 
argues that the district com1 erred by overruling his objection that a testifying officer ·was not 
qualified to give opinion testimony concerning the direction a bullet had traveled. He also 
contends that the court erred by allowing the prosecutor to make inaccurate statements during 




Lora Adams moved to Idaho and briefly dated Larson, her neighbor. After the 
relationship soured and Adams attempted to avoid contact, Larson vvas upset and made repeated 
efforts to convince Adams to continue dating him. Adams later began dating another man, John 
Bilsky. It is undisputed that Larson and Adams had an altercation, that Bilsky arrived shortly 
thereafter, and that Bilsky and Larson both discharged their firearms. The parties sharply dispute 
the details of the occurrence, but Larson was charged with tvvo counts of aggravated assault, 
Idaho Code §§ 18-901, 18-905. 
At Larson's trial, Adams and Bil sky testified as follows. They said that Larson was 
chronically abusive toward Adams, having repeatedly verbally and physically thseatened her, 
and that Larson's violent behavior escalated on the day in question. In order for Adams to reach 
her home, she had to travel over a private road, a po11ion of which passed through Larson's 
property. Larson had placed two cables across the road at points on his prope11y, using them as 
makeshift gates. Because of Larson's threatening behavior, Adams began notifying Bilsky when 
she was heading home and would be passing over Larson's land. 
On the afternoon in question, Adams called Bilsky to tell him she was nearly home. 
When Adams came upon the first cable gate, she saw Larson in the vicinity and she relayed that 
information to Bilsky. Adams got out of her SUV to move the cable so that she could pass. 
Larson approached her angrily and drunkenly, shouted obscenities, and physically prevented her 
from getting back into her SUV. Adams tried to get away, but Larson slammed her hand in the 
vehicle door. Adams responded by kicking Larson. Larson then punched Adams and threw her 
to the ground, straddled her, and placed his gun on her face, saying, "I'm going to kill you and I 
want you to be more afraid than you've ever been in your life." Keeping one hand on his gun, 
Larson choked Adams with his other hand until Bilsky arrived. 
When Adams did not arrive at home quickly, Bilsky became worried. He grabbed his 
revolver and walked from Adams' home toward the first gate. As he approached and walked 
around to the passenger side of Adams' vehicle, he saw Larson. Larson pointed his gun at 
Bilsky and took a position at the rear of Adams' SUV. From that position, Larson told Bilsky to 
leave and thTeatened to kill him. Bilsky took a position at the front driver's side of the SUV and 
moved back and away from the vehicle, keeping the vehicle between himself and Larson. 
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Thereafter, Larson, standing at the rear driver's side of the vehicle, fired several shots at Bilsky, 
but did not hit him. Bilsky returned fire. After Bilsky's second shot, Larson lowered his 
weapon. Bilsky and Adams fled in the SUV, afraid that Larson would reload and continue 
firing. In support of Adams' testimony, the State submitted pictures of her injuries. Those 
photographs depict redness circling the front of Adams' neck, over her trachea; red marks on 
both sides of Adams' face with t,:vo parallel scratches on the left side of her face; redness on 
Adams' torso; and a cut on Adams' hand. 
Larson's testimony sharply contradicted the testimony of Adams and Bilsky. Larson said 
that he went to speak to Adams because she had repeatedly removed the surveyor's tape placed 
on the cable gates to increase visibility and refused to close the cable gates after passing through 
them, leaving the cables in the snow bank. When Adams arrived at the gate, he respectfully 
asked her to close the gate after passing through. Adams responded by apologizing for her 
interference with the gate. As Adams went back to her SUV, Larson tripped and fell into the 
vehicle's door, trapping Adams' hand between the door and the body of the vehicle and injuring 
her. Larson immediately apologized, but Adams attacked Larson, trying to knee him in the 
groin. Larson defended himself by pushing her into the snow. While Larson and Adams fought, 
Bilsky arrived at the area. Larson did not see him arrive, but heard him ask Adams if she was 
alright. Before Larson could turn around and face Bilsky, Bilsky shot Larson. Larson drew and 
repeatedly discharged his firearm until he was out of bullets. He testified that he "emptied [his) 
weapon just instinctually" because he bad been shot and that he did not point his weapon at 
either Bilsky or Adams. After Bilsky and Adams fled, neighbors who had heard the shots called 
911 for help and provided first aid. Larson was taken to the hospital for treatment of his gunshot 
wound. 
Investigating police officers collected both Larson's Ruger .44 Magnum Red Hawk and 
Bilsky's Taurus .357. When seized, Bilsky's weapon contained two spent shell casings and five 
unspent bullets. Larson's weapon had been emptied by a neighbor who removed the empty shell 
casings at the scene while providing first aid to Larson. Officers found six spent .44 Magnum 
shell casings consistent with Larson's six-chamber firearm. 
Larson was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, one count alleging that he 
threatened Adams with a firearm and one count alleging that he threatened Bilsky or attempted 
to injure him with a firearm, all in violation of LC. §§ 18-901, 18-905. At a jury trial, Larson 
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was found guilty on both counts. Larson appeals from the judgment of conviction, asserting 




A. The Court Did Not Err by Permitting the Officer to Testify as an Expert 
During trial, the court permitted jurors to submit questions. After each witness testified, 
the court reviewed the questions with counsel and with the witness. After an officer testified 
regarding his investigation, including his observation of damage to Adams' SUV, a juror 
submitted a question asking whether the officer knew which direction a bullet traveled when it 
passed through the driver's side mirror of the SUV. Outside of the presence of the jury, the 
officer indicated that he did not know which direction the bullet traveled, and the court did not 
ask the question of that witness. 
Later, the State called another investigating officer. In response to a question by the 
prosecutor, he testified that the bullet passed through the miITor from in front of the vehicle 
toward the rear of the vehicle. Larson objected as to foundation, and the court sustained the 
objection. In response, the State attempted to lay foundation. The officer testified that he had 
"very general" training regarding ballistics, bullet travel, and investigations relating to bullets. 
That training and experience consisted of carrying a firearm virtually every day for twenty years, 
testing or practicing using his firearm to remain qualified for his duties, "some schooling in 
shootings," participation in fifty to one hundred investigations that required determination as to 
which direction a bullet entered and exited an object, and helping his "underlings at the sheriff's 
department" work their cases. He also related his history of observing items that had been shot 
during his career and that he had stated, "[g]enerally, when a bullet enters an object, the entrance 
hole is the size or diameter of the bullet" and the exit hole is ''a bigger hole." He explained that a 
bullet usually "mushrooms" when traveling through a medium such that its diameter ·when 
exiting a medium is wider than its diameter when entering a medium. He explained that the hole 
in the front of the driver's side mirror, the painted fiberglass portion, had a smaller hole than the 
back portion of the mirror, the mirrored side. Over several objections, the court permitted the 
officer to testify that he had concluded that the bullet traveled from the front of the vehicle 
toward the rear of the vehicle. 
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Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony and states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a ,vitness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
"The five sources of expert qualifications identified in the rule are disjunctive. Therefore, 
academic training is not always a prerequisite to be qualified as an expe1t; practical experience or 
specialized knowledge may be sufficient." State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 82, 190 P.3d 896, 901 
(Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Idaho Dep 't of Health & We~fc1re v. Doe, 
149 Idaho 4 74, 4 77, 235 P .3d 1195, 1198 (2010) ("Formal training is not necessary, but practical 
experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a \Vitness vvithin the category of an 
expert." (quoting Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 
(2007))). For example, we have held that a detective's training regarding Internet crimes against 
minors and experience investigating those crimes rendered him competent to testify "in regard to 
the uniqueness of screen names and the applications of Yahoo" even though the officer lacked 
"specific computer program training." Glass, 146 Idaho at 83, 190 P.Jd at 902. The 
admissibility of expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court 
will not disturb the lower court's ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. Fragnella v. 
Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 274, 281 P.Jd 103, 111 (2012); .J-U-B Eng 'rs, Inc. v. Securi~}I Ins. Co. 
of Har{ford, 146 Idaho 311, 315, 193 P.3d 858, 862 (2008). 
The defense argues that the officer's opinion testimony on the bullet's direction of travel 
was "technical ballistics information" and that the officer never testified that he had been the 
person responsible for determining the path a bullet traveled in any particular case. We 
conclude, however, that the officer had sufficient expertise and that the defendant inaccurately 
characterizes the testimony as "technical ballistics information." Within any domain of 
knowledge there are more technical and less technical areas; there is expertise that can only be 
acquired by significant scientific or technical study, and there are matters that are common 
knowledge to anyone experienced in a particular field. Our Supreme Court recognized this when 
it noted that an expert "may be qualified to render opinions about some things within a particular 
professional field but not others." Glass, 146 Idaho at 83, 190 P.3d at 902. Accordingly, we 
need not determine whethel' the district court erred by permitting the officer's testimony here 
because he may lack the knowledge required to give expert ballistics testimony in some 
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hypothetical case; we need only decide if the district court erred by concluding that the officer 
had sufficient expertise to render the specific opinion he gave in this case. 
In our vie,v, the mushrooming of bullets and the relative size of entrance and exit holes 
are not particularly technical or arcane subjects. Both the deformation of bullets once fired into a 
dense medium and the size of the entrance and exit holes on an object vvould be readily 
observable to any person watching the process. One need not engage in extensive teclmical 
study, take specialized measurements, or employ specialized tools of scientific analysis to make 
these simple observations. We suspect that any person who routinely uses a firearm to shoot 
objects or who sees the aftermath of such shootings as a regular part of their employment or 
recreation could make such an observation. Here, the officer testified that his skills with a 
firearm are routinely assessed, demonstrating his regular use of firearms; that he has frequently 
seen the aftermath of such shootings in his work; and that he has participated in many 
investigations that included determining a bullet's path. Accordingly, ,ve conclude that the court 
did not abuse its discretion by allowing the officer to state his opinion. 
B. The Court Erred by Overruling an Objection to the Prosccuto1·'s Explanation of a 
Jury Instruction, but the Error Is Harmless 
Larson also argues that the district court erred by overruling his objection to the 
prosecutor's statements during closing argument regarding a jury instruction that was based on 
I.C. § 18-114. Both the statute and the instruction given by the district court state, "In every 
crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent." The 
prosecutor told the jury that "the word 'intent' in this context does not mean the intent to commit 
a crime." Larson objected to that characterization, but his objection was overruled. The 
prosecutor then continued: 
PROSECUTOR: [Y]ou don't have to have the intent to commit the crime 
itself; you [need to] have the intent to commit the interdicted act. That is, you 
don't have to have the intent to commit the crime of aggravated assault; you have 
to have the intent to point and point the weapon, use--
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, again. 
PROSECUTOR: --so in an assaultive manner. 
Larson's objection was again overruled and the prosecutor continued by analogizing the instant 
case to a driving under the influence case where the State would be required to prove the intent 
to drive but not the intent to drive while under the influence of alcohol. 
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By terms of the statute under which Larson was charged, LC. § 18-901, a person can 
commit the crime of assault in one of two ways: 
(a) An unlmvful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a 
violent injury on the person of another; or 
(b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the 
person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act 
which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is 
imminent. 
The instructions given to the jury correctly specified the elements under each of these 
subsections. Larson argues that the prosecutor's purported explanation of the mental element 
misstated the law and impermissibly reduced the State's burden of proof. 
The State argues that the prosecutor properly described the applicable intent requirement, 
relying upon State v. Bonapane, 114 Idaho 577, 759 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988). With respect to 
the "attempt" form of assault defined in I.C. § 18-901 (a), that opinion states that "the intent 
element of assault with a deadly weapon may be satisfied by proof [that the defendant] intended 
to cause harm when firing [a gun] or that he fired it with reckless disregard for the risk of injury 
he thereby created." Bonaparte, I I 4 Idaho at 580-81, 7 59 P.2d at 86-87 ( emphasis added). The 
Bonaparte decision largely rests upon the holding in State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 88 P.2d 493 
(1939). In Pallerson, the defendant was charged with the "attempt" form of assault. It was 
alleged that he, knmving that a home was occupied and in range of his shotgun, and unable to see 
the home or the people in it because of darkness, nonetheless "carelessly, negligently and 
wantonly and recklessly" discharged a firearm at a home, striking a person with a shotgun 
pellet. 1 After a jury found the defendant guilty, he unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the 
basis that the State had not proven that he intended to commit a violent injury. The Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that actual intent to injure must be proved. 
The Court said: 
Where . . . the injury is the result of reckless, wanton, and willful conduct, 
showing an utter disregard for the safety of others, the la,v imputes to the 
wrongdoer a willful and malicious intention even though he may not in fact have 
entertained such intention. 
The defendant sought to dismiss the information arguing that it \Vas duplicative because it 
charged both assault and battery. The court overruled the motion, holding that other language in 
the pleading amounted to an election to proceed solely as to an assault charge. 
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!cl at 73, 88 P.2d at 495 (quoting Brimhall v. State, 255 P. 165 (Ariz. 1927), overruled by State v. 
Balderrama, 397 P.2d 632, 636 (Ariz. 1964)). 
We have previously noted that Pa!lerson and Bonaparte are inconsistent with more 
recent Idaho appellate authority. In State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 46, 13 PJd 1256, 1259 (Ct. 
App. 2000) we said, "[T]his Court doubts the continuing viability of the Patterson rule in light of 
more recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions indicating that guilt of 'attempt' crimes requires 
intent to commit the 'attempted' offense." We went on to hold that, with the defendant having 
been charged with the "threat" type of assault under I.C. § l 8-90 l (b ), it was error for the trial 
court to give a jury instruction that "the law will impute or attribute to the defendant a willful 
intention even though he may not in fact have entertained such intention" because the instruction 
diminished the State's burden to prove the mental element of the offense and, in effect, modified 
the mental element from intent to negligence. Crowe, 135 Idaho at 47, 13 P.3d at 1260. Here, 
because Larson was charged under both the "threat" and "attempt" types of assault, ,,ve must 
address the continued viability of Bonaparte and Patterson. 
For the last two decades, both this Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have held that the 
specific intent to commit the "attempted" act is an element of an attempt charge. In State v. 
Pmt!, 125 Idaho 546,558,873 P.2d 800,812 (1993), the Idaho Supreme Court held that when a 
person is charged with the "crime of attempt to commit a crime ... the state bears the burden of 
proving that the defendant intended to commit the crime." The Court credited the defendant's 
argument that this conclusion is required by J.C. § 18-305, which defines attempts. Although the 
Supreme Court did not specifically overrule Patterson, it did announce a general rule, and we see 
no principled basis upon which ,ve could conclude that an attempt for the purpose of the assault 
statute is treated differently from an attempt to commit some other crime, Patterson and 
Bonaparte are also inconsistent with more recent decisions of this Court. State v. Grove, 151 
Idaho 483, 494, 259 P.3d 629, 640 (Ct. App. 2011) ("attempts are, by definition, specific intent 
crimes"); State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 445, 224 P.3d 509, 512 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that 
it was error to give the general intent jury instruction for an aggravated assault charge); State v. 
Swader, 137 Idaho 733, 737, 52 P.3d 878,882 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Attempt consists of the intent to 
do an act which would in law amount to a crime and an act in furtherance of that intent."); State 
v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,401, 3 P.3d 67, 79 (Ct. App. 2000) ("All attempts are specific intent 
crimes,"); accord 2 w. LAFAVE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.3(a) (2nd eel. 2003) ("An 
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attempt to commit any crime requires specific intent to commit that crime; and so assault of the 
attempted-battery sort requires an intent to commit a battery."); see also State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 
370, 375, 79 P.Jd 729, 734 (Ct. App. 2003) (declining to apply Patlerson in a battery case and 
holding that the mens rea applicable to a battery charge requires that a defendant "intend a 
forceful or violent contact with another person"). 2 Accordingly, we conclude that Patterson and 
Bonaparte have been implicitly ovem1led and that by the plain language of LC. § 18-901(a), 
assault by attempt to commit a violent injury requires actual intent to injure. 
As to the second means of committing assault, "Idaho Code § 18-90 I (b) requires only 
that the state prove an intent to make a threat." State v. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888, 891, 55 P.3d 
881, 884 (Ct. App. 2002); see also Pole, 139 Idaho at 373, 79 P.3d at 732 (holding that 
"aggravated assault under I.C. § 18-90 I (b) requires an intent to make a threat, by word or act, to 
do violence to another, but no actual intention to cause apprehension"). In Hansen, 148 Idaho at 
445, 224 P.3d at 512, this Court found error in an instruction that diminished the intent element 
where the defendant was charged with aggravated assault by threatening the victim with a deadly 
weapon. The trial court there instructed the jury that "[i]ntent under Idaho law is not an intent to 
commit a crime but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the act committed." Id. (emphasis 
added). The defendant argued that this instruction was erroneous because it required only the 
intent to fire a weapon, i.e. "the act committed," but not the intent to threaten the victim. Id. We 
agreed and concluded that giving the instruction amounted to error. Id. at 445-46. 
Here, the prosecutor's statement was not consistent with the foregoing authorities. The 
"intent to point a weapon ... in an assaultive manner" is not the equivalent of the intent to cause 
a violent injury, the mens rea element required by I.C. § 18-901 (a); one can point a firearm at a 
person in an intimidating way but not intend to shoot. Likewise, an "intent to commit the 
interdicted act" is not equivalent to the intent to threaten, the mens rea element required by l.C. 
2 We have also held that when instructing the jury regarding LC.§ 18-901(a), it is 
sufficient to use the plain words of the statute. See State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663, 666, 84 
P.3d 599, 602 (Ct. App. 2004). The common usage of the term "attempt" as generally 
understood by the public is sufficient to convey to the jury that they must "find an element of 
intentional action" in order to return a guilty verdict. Id. 
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§ 18-90 l (b). 3 The meaning of the "intent to commit the interdicted act" is ambiguous and could 
have been understood by the jury to require only an intent to point the weapon. It is equivalent 
to the intent to "perform the act committed," language used in Hansen, 148 Idaho at 445-46, 224 
P.3d at 512-13, \:vhich we held to be erroneous when a person is charged with assault under I.C. 
§ 18-901(b). Because the prosecutor's description of the required mental elements was 
inaccurate, the district court erred by overruling Larson's objection. 
Having found error, we must determine ·whether that error was harmless. Here, the harm 
produced by the error is akin to harm produced by instructional error--the possibility that the jury 
reached its verdict based upon an erroneous legal standard. For instrnctional error we apply a 
two-part test: 
[A]n appellate court mllst first determine whether an improper jury instruction 
affected the entire deliberative process. If it did, then a reversal is necessary as 
the jury's deliberations were fundamentally flawed, and any attempted harmless 
error inquiry vvould essentially result in the appellate court itself acting in the role 
of jury. However, ,vhere the jury instructions were only partially erroneous, such 
as where the jury instructions improperly omitted one element of a charged 
offense, the appellate comt may apply the harmless effor test, and where the 
evidence supporting a finding on the omitted element is ovenvhelming and 
uncontrove1ied, so that no rational jury could have found that the state failed to 
prove that element, the constitutional violation may be deemed harmless. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (20 IO); see also Neder v. United Stales, 
527 U.S. 1 (1999) (applying harmless error analysis to instructional enor). 
Few errors "affect the entire deliberative process." For example, a defective reasonable 
doubt instruction is a structural defect that vitiates the jury's entire deliberative process. Perry, 
150 Idaho at 223, 245 P.3d at 975; see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). The 
erroneous description of the intent element does not affect the entire deliberative process and 
thus we may review for harmless error. See Hansen, 148 Idaho at 447,224 P.3d at 514 (wherein 
we applied hannless error analysis to an analogous instrnction error). We must determine 
whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a finding for the defendant, 
with respect to the omitted element. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. 
3 Whether the intent to "point the weapon , .. in an assaultive manner" is the equivalent of 
an intent to threaten may be a closer question. However, we note that this description is 
hopelessly circular because it describes an element of the crime of assault by using the term 
"assaultive." 
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In Hansen, we concluded that the instructional error was hannless because "the record 
contains no evidence that could rationally lead to a finding for [the defendant) with respect to the 
intentional threat element." Hansen, 148 Idaho at 447, 224 P.3d at 514. In that case, the "intent 
to tlu·eaten element was not seriously contested." id. at 446,224 P.3d at 513. The defendant did 
not claim that he lacked the requisite intent; instead, Hansen appears to have argued that the 
State could not prove whether it was he or his associate who discharged the firearm. We 
concluded that there was no basis in the evidence from which the jury could have found that it 
was Hansen who fired the weapon but that he did not have the intent to threaten the victims. 
Likewise in State v. Thompson, 143 Idaho 155, 139 P.3d 757 (Ct. App. 2006), we 
concluded that the judge's failure to give the required mens rea instruction was harmless error. 
In that case, the defendant argued that the police lied ,vhen they said that he possessed drugs in 
his pockets, asserting, inter alia, that his pants had no pockets. Id. at 159, 139 P.3d at 761. The 
instructions given to the jury omitted an element of the offense requiring the State to prove that 
the defendant knew the substance in his possession was a controlled substance. In that case, we 
concluded that the instructional error \Vas harmless given that the jury's finding of guilt 
amounted to a rejection of the proffered defense. Id. We observed that there \Vas no evidence 
whereby the jury could have rejected Thompson's "pocketless sweatpants" defense, as it did, and 
also find that he had a controlled substance in his pockets but did not realize that it was a 
controlled substance. Id. 
Both cases are consistent with the rationale of the United States Supreme Court's 
harmless error analysis in instructional error cases. "Reversal without any consideration of the 
effect of the error upon the verdict" ,vould result in needless retrials "not focused at all on the 
[issues raised on appeal], but on contested issues on vvhich the jury was properly instructed." 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 15. 
In this case, we find the error harmless. Here, the jury was properly instructed as to both 
prongs of an assault charge. It was also instructed, "You must follow the rules as I explain them 
to you ... If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my instrnction you 
must follow." Thus, the jury was told not to rely on an attorney's argument that was inconsistent 
,:vith the court's instrnction. Further, even if the jury applied the lav,r as erroneously described by 
the prosecutor, it necessarily rejected Larson's defenses. Larson had two somewhat 
contradictory defenses, and the State offered two potentially inconsistent descriptions of the 
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intent required: "intent to commit the interdicted act"4 and "intent to ... point the weapon ... in 
an assaultive manner." Under any combination of defense and erroneous statement of the mens 
rea, the error was harmless. 
We address first the charge of assault on Bilsky. Larson's first defense was that Bilsky 
shot first and Larson acted in self-defense. The jury was instructed regarding self-defense and 
necessarily rejected that defense in finding Larson guilty of an aggravated assault on Bilsky. The 
erroneous mens rea description could not have affected the jury's determination of the self-
defense claim. 
Larson's second defense was that he reflexively fired his gun without aiming it at anyone. 
Even if we assume that the jury applied the "intent to commit the interdicted act" mens rea, as 
described by the prosecutor, in the manner most detrimental to Larson, the jury must have found 
that Larson intended to point or fire his gun, rejecting the mistake or reflex defense. Likewise, a 
jury dete1rnination that Larson "inten[ded] to ... point the weapon ... in an assaultive manner" 
also rejects the reflex or mistake defense. 
We similarly conclude that with respect to the charge of assault on Adams, the jury 
necessarily rejected Larson's defense and that any erroneous description of the mental element 
did not affect the verdict. As to that count, the State's evidence was that Larson put his firearm 
on Adams' face and said, "I'm going to kill you and I want yoll to be more afraid than you've 
ever been in your life." If Larson intended to commit that "interdicted act" (putting the firearm 
on Adams' face), he certainly intended to threaten Adams. Larson did not contend that he 
performed this act but without intent to threaten; be testified that he did not do it at all. The jury 
rejected that contention. No rational jury could conclude that Larson pressed the weapon to 
Adams' face but did so without intent to threaten. 
There is no version of the facts presented in the trial evidence that could rationally 
support a finding that Larson intentionally fired his gun without intent to threaten or injure 
4 This Court has used the phrase "interdicted act" in modern opinions because that term 
was used as a term of art in older cases. See, e.g., State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 78, 310 P.2d 
1082, l 083 (1957); Stcae v. Tc~Jl/or, 59 Idaho 724, 73 8, 87 P .2d 454, 460 (1939); State v. Billings, 
137 Idaho 827, 830, 54 P.3d 470, 473 (Ct. App. 2002). However, the phrase is not commonly 
used by either laVi'yers or laypeople and could easily be misunderstood. Therefore, in our view, 
use of that term to explain an issue to ajmy is unhelpful and should be avoided. 
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Bilsky, or intentionally pressed his gun against Adams' face without the intent lo threaten her. 
Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the prosecutor's erroneous mens rea description 
affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, a retrial v,1ould serve only to permit Larson to 
relitigate defenses that the jury rejected. Therefore, we conclude that the error was harmiess. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err by permitting the officer to testify to his opinion on the 
direction of travel of a bullet. Although we conclude that the district comt erred by failing to 
sustain Larson's objection when the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the intent element for 
assault, this error was harmless on the facts of this case. Accordingly, the judgment of 
conviction is affirmed. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
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